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We study a two-country two-sector model of international trade in which one sector produces homogeneous
products while the other produces differentiated products. The differentiated-product industry has
firm heterogeneity, monopolistic competition, search and matching in its labor market, and wage bargaining.
Some of the workers searching for jobs end up being unemployed. Countries are similar except for
frictions in their labor markets. We study the interaction of labor market rigidities and trade impediments
in shaping welfare, trade flows, productivity, price levels and unemployment rates. We show that both
countries gain from trade but that the flexible country -- which has lower labor market frictions -- gains
proportionately more. A flexible labor market confers comparative advantage; the flexible country
exports differentiated products on net. A country benefits by lowering frictions in its labor market,
but this harms the country's trade partner. And the simultaneous proportional lowering of labor market
frictions in both countries benefits both of them. The model generates rich patterns of unemployment.
Specifically, trade integration -- which benefits both countries -- may raise their rates of unemployment.
Moreover, differences in rates of unemployment do not necessarily reflect differences in labor market
rigidities; the rate of unemployment can be higher or lower in the flexible country. Finally, we show
that the flexible country has both higher total factor productivity and a lower price level, which operates













International trade and international capital ￿ ows link national economies. Although such links are
considered to be bene￿cial for the most part, they produce an interdependence that occasionally
has harmful e⁄ects. In particular, shocks that emanate in one country may negatively impact trade
partners. On the trade side, links through terms-of-trade movements have been widely studied,
and it is now well understood that, say, capital accumulation or technological change can worsen a
trade partner￿ s terms of trade and reduce its welfare. On the macro side, the transmission of real
business cycles has been widely studied, such as the impact of technology shocks in one country on
income ￿ uctuations in its trade partners.
Although a large literature addresses the relationship between trade and unemployment, we
fall short of understanding how these links depend on labor market institutions. There is growing
awareness that institutions a⁄ect comparative advantage and trade ￿ ows. Levchenko (2007), Nunn
(2007) and Costinot (2006) provide evidence on the impact of legal institutions, while Cuæat and
Melitz (2007) and Chor (2006) provide evidence on the impact of labor market institutions.
Indeed, measures of labor market ￿ exibility developed by Botero et al. (2004) di⁄er greatly
across countries.1 The rigidity of employment index, which is an average of three other indexes￿
di¢ culty of hiring, di¢ culty of ￿ring, and rigidity of hours￿ shows wide variation in its range
between zero and one hundred (where higher values represent larger rigidities). Importantly, coun-
tries with very di⁄erent development levels may have similar labor market rigidities. For example,
Chad, Morocco and Spain have indexes of 60, 63 and 63, respectively, which are about twice the
average for the OECD countries (which is 33.3) and higher than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa.
The United States has the lowest index, equal to zero, while Australia has an index of three and
New Zealand has an index of seven, all signi￿cantly below the OECD average. Yet some of the
much poorer countries also have very ￿ exible labor markets, e.g., both Uganda and Togo have an
index of seven.
We develop in this paper a two-country model of international trade in order to study the e⁄ects
of labor market frictions on trade ￿ ows, productivity, price levels, welfare and unemployment. We
are particularly interested in the impact of a country￿ s labor market rigidities on its trade partner,
and the di⁄erential impact of lower trade impediments on countries with di⁄erent labor market
institutions. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) emphasize the need to allow for interactions between
shocks and di⁄erences in labor market institutions in order to explain the evolution of unemploy-
ment in European economies. They show that these interactions are empirically important. On
the other side, Nickell et al. (2002) emphasize changes over time in labor market institutions as
important determinants of the evolution of unemployment in OECD countries. While these stud-
ies use rich data on labor market institutions, our theoretical model parametrizes labor market
1Their original data has been updated by the World Bank and is now available at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/EmployingWorkers/. The numbers reported in the text come
from this site, downloaded on May 20, 2007. It is important to note that other measures of labor market
characteristics are available for OECD countries; see Nickell (1997) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
1rigidities in a simple way, which can be related to a variety of labor market features, such as the
cost of vacancies and the e¢ ciency of matching in labor markets. Nevertheless, we show that this
representation of labor market institutions generates rich patterns of unemployment in response to
both variation across countries in labor market frictions and changes in trade impediments.
The literature on trade and unemployment is large and varied. One strand of this literature con-
siders economies with minimum wages, of which Brecher (1974) represents an early contribution.2
Another approach, due to Matusz (1986), uses implicit contracts. A third approach, exempli￿ed
by Copland (1989), incorporates e¢ ciency wages into trade models.3 Yet another line of research
uses fair wages. Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) illustrate this
approach. The ￿nal approach uses search and matching in labor markets. While two early studies
extended the two-sector model of Jones (1965) to economies with this type of labor market fric-
tion,4 Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) provide a particularly valuable analysis of international
trade with labor markets that are characterized by Mortensen-Pissarides-type search and match-
ing frictions.5 In their model di⁄erences in labor market frictions, both across sectors and across
countries, generate Ricardian type comparative advantage.6
Our two-sector model incorporates Mortensen-Pissarides-type frictions into a sector that pro-
duces di⁄erentiated products; another sector manufactures homogeneous goods under constant
returns to scale. In the di⁄erentiated-product sector heterogeneous ￿rms compete monopolisti-
cally, as in Melitz (2003). These ￿rms exercise market power in the product market on the one
hand, and bargain with workers over wages on the other.7 As in models with home market e⁄ects,
it is costly to trade di⁄erentiated products. Moreover, there are ￿xed and variable trade costs.
We develop the model in stages. The next section describes demand, product markets, labor
markets, and the determinants of wages and pro￿ts in a closed economy. In Section 3 we examine
the general equilibrium impact of labor market rigidities on economic outcomes in a closed economy,
and show that the relationship between unemployment and labor market rigidities is hump-shaped.
The model is extended to a world of two trading countries in Section 4. We focus on an equi-
librium in which both countries are incompletely specialized, and￿ as in Melitz (2003)￿ only a
fraction of ￿rms export in the di⁄erentiated-product industry and some entrants exit this indus-
try. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of labor market institutions on trade, welfare,
productivity, price levels and real exchange rates in Section 5. There we also study the di⁄erential
impact of lower trade impediments on countries with di⁄erent labor market institutions. Impor-
2His approach has been extended by Davis (1998) to study how wages are determined when two countries trade
with each other, one with and one without a minimum wage.
3See also Brecher (1992) and Hoon (2001).
4See Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1988) and Hosios (1990).
5See Pissarides (2000) for the theory of search and matching in labor markets.
6More work has followed this line of inquiry than the other approaches mentioned in the text. Recent examples
include Davidson and Matusz (2006a, 2006b) and Moore and Ranjan (2005).
7A surge of papers has incorporating labor market frictions into models with heterogeneous ￿rms. Egger and
Kreickemeier (2006) examine trade liberalization in an environment with fair wages and Davis and Harrigan (2007)
examine trade liberalization in an environment with e¢ ciency wages; both papers focus on the wage dispersion of
identical workers across heterogeneous ￿rms. Mitra and Ranjan (2007) examine o⁄shoring in an environment with
search and matching.
2tantly, we show that both countries gain from trade in welfare terms and in terms of total factor
productivity, independently of trade costs and di⁄erences in labor market institutions.8 However,
the country with lower frictions in the labor market gains from trade proportionately more. The
lowering of labor market frictions in one country raises its welfare, but it harms the trade partner.
Nevertheless, both countries bene￿t from simultaneous proportional improvements in labor market
institution across the world.
In Section 5 we also show that labor market ￿ exibility is a source of comparative advantage.
The ￿ exible country has a larger fraction of exporting ￿rms and it exports di⁄erentiated products
on net. Moreover, the share of intra-industry trade is smaller and the total volume of trade is
larger the larger are the di⁄erences in labor market rigidities. We also show that welfare and
productivity are higher in the more ￿ exible country, and that its price level is lower. As a result,
productivity is negatively correlated with the price level and positively correlated with the real
exchange rate, which is in the opposite direction to the classical Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect. In other
words, di⁄erences in labor market institutions can operate against this e⁄ect.
In Section 6 we take up unemployment. We show that in an open economy the relationship
between unemployment and labor market rigidities is hump-shaped, just like it is in a closed econ-
omy. An improvement in labor market institutions decreases the sectoral rate of unemployment and
induces more workers to search for jobs in the di⁄erentiated-product sector, which has the higher
sectoral rate of unemployment. These two e⁄ects impact unemployment in opposite directions,
with the latter dominating in highly rigid labor markets and the former dominating in highly ￿ ex-
ible labor markets. As a result, unemployment initially increases and then decreases as a country
improves its labor market institutions, starting from high levels of rigidity. Finally, a country￿ s
improvement in labor market institutions reduces unemployment in its trading partner by inducing
a labor reallocation from the di⁄erentiated-product sector to the homogenous product sector.
We also show that lowering trade impediments can increase unemployment in one or both
countries, despite its positive welfare e⁄ects, and that the interaction between trade impediments
and labor market rigidities produces rich patterns of unemployment. Speci￿cally, di⁄erences in
rates of unemployment do not necessarily re￿ ect di⁄erences in labor market institutions; the ￿ exible
country can have higher or lower unemployment, depending on the height of trade impediments
and the levels of labor market frictions.
The unemployment results depend on certain structural features of the model, while the welfare,
productivity, and trade pattern results are less sensitive to these characteristics. In particular, the
impact of trade liberalization on unemployment as a function of di⁄erences in labor market rigidities
depends on the fact that trade impediments are higher in the sector with higher labor market
frictions (i.e., the di⁄erentiated-product sector). Under these circumstances trade liberalization
induces an expansion of activity in the sector with the higher sectoral rate of unemployment. It
will become clear from the analysis how the results would di⁄er if protection were higher in the
8We also show that the combination of variable trade costs and di⁄erences in labor market institutions have to
satisfy a certain condition for the equilibrium to have incomplete specialization in both countries. However, the
welfare results extend to cases with partial or full specialization.
3sector with lower frictions in the labor market. To avoid a taxonomy of cases, however, we focus
on one case only.
The last section summarizes some of the main insights and states our conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
In order to discuss the links between trade and employment, we develop in this section the building
blocks of our analytical model. They consist of a demand structure, technologies, product market
structures, determinants of wages and pro￿ts, and the structure of the labor market. After describ-
ing these ingredients in some detail, we discuss in the next section general equilibrium features of
a closed economy, before proceeding to analyze general equilibrium interactions in a two-country
world.
2.1 Preferences and Demand
Consider an economy with a representative agent who consumes a homogenous product q0 and a
continuum of brands of a di⁄erentiated product. The real consumption index of the di⁄erentiated







; 0 < ￿ < 1: (1)
In this formulation q (!) represents consumption of variety !, ￿ represents the set of varieties
available for consumption, and ￿ is a parameter that controls the elasticity of substitution between




for brand !, where p(!) is its price, 1=(1 ￿ ￿) > 1 is its demand elasticity, and D is its demand











is the ideal price index of Q.10
Next assume that the consumer￿ s preferences between the homogeneous product, q0, and the
consumption index of the di⁄erentiated product, Q, are represented by the quasi-linear utility
9Alternatively, we could interpret Q to be a homogeneous product and the q (!)s to be intermediate inputs.
10A solution of the consumer￿ s allocation problem for a spending level EQ on varieties of the di⁄erentiated product
yields the demand functions q(!) = Dp(!)
￿1=(1￿￿) with D = EQ=
R
!2￿ p(!)
￿￿=(1￿￿)d!. Using the formula for the
price index P and the fact that EQ = PQ then implies that D = QP
1=(1￿￿).
4function11
U = q0 +
1
￿
Q￿; 0 < ￿ < ￿.
The restriction ￿ < ￿ ensures that the varieties are better complements for each other than for the
outside good q0.12 We also assume that the consumer has a large enough income level to always
consume positive quantities of the outside good, in which case it is convenient to choose the outside
good as numeraire. We therefore normalize the price of q0 to equal one, so that both p(!) and P
are measured relative to the price of the homogeneous product.
The utility function U implies that a consumer with total consumption spending E who faces
the price index P for the di⁄erentiated product chooses Q = P￿1=(1￿￿), and q0 = E ￿ P￿￿=(1￿￿).13
Under these circumstances the indirect utility function is







and the demand level D satis￿es D = Q￿(￿￿￿)=(1￿￿). As a result, the demand function for brand







As usual, the indirect utility function V is increasing in spending and declining in price.14
Therefore lower values of Q, where Q = P￿1=(1￿￿), represent lower welfare. Lower values of Q
imply in turn higher demand levels, as is apparent from (3). Therefore, in the model, higher demand
levels represent lower levels of competitiveness, because the demand level facing an individual ￿rm
is higher the higher the price index P is, and the latter is higher either because prices of competing
brands are higher or there are fewer of them. In the analysis of equilibria we shall characterize
equilibrium values of Q, from which we shall infer welfare levels.
2.2 Technologies and Market Structure
All goods are produced with labor, which is the only factor of production. The homogeneous
product requires one unit of labor per unit output and the market for this product is competitive.
When h0 workers are employed in the production of the homogeneous product, its output level
equals h0.
The market for brands of the di⁄erentiated product is monopolistically competitive. A ￿rm
that seeks to supply a brand ! bears an entry cost fe in terms of the homogenous good, which
covers the technology cost and the cost of setting up shop in the industry. After bearing this cost,
the ￿rm learns how productive its technology is, as measured by the parameter ￿; a ￿-￿rm requires
11Alternatively, we could use a homothetic utility function in q0 and Q; see Appendix for a discussion of this case.
12This model can be analyzed without the restriction ￿ > 0. This assumption, however, allows us to avoid discussing
alternative special cases and brings out some of the interesting results in a clear way.
13The assumption that consumer spending on the outside good is positive is equivalent to assuming E > P
￿￿=(1￿￿).
Since ￿ > 0, the demand for Q is elastic and PQ increases when P falls.
14The second term on the right hand side of V represents consumer surplus.
51=￿ workers per unit output. In other words, if a ￿-￿rm employs h workers it produces ￿h units of
output. Before entry the ￿rm expects ￿ to be drawn from a known cumulative distribution.
After entry the ￿rm has to bear a ￿xed production cost fd in terms of the homogeneous good;
without it no manufacturing is possible. If a ￿rm with productivity ￿ hires h workers, then (3)
implies that its revenue equals R = Q￿(￿￿￿) (￿h)
￿. This revenue has to cover wages and the ￿xed
cost fd for production to be pro￿table.15 If revenue is insu¢ cient to cover these costs for all
employment levels h, the ￿rm closes shop and exits the industry. Otherwise the ￿rm chooses an
employment level that maximizes pro￿ts. Anticipating these choices after entry, the ￿rm enters if
and only if its expected operating pro￿ts, i.e., expected revenue minus labor costs minus ￿xed cost
of production, are su¢ ciently high to cover its entry cost. We elaborate on these decisions below.
2.3 Wages and Pro￿ts
There are no labor frictions in the homogeneous-product sector, which means that workers can
be replaced there at no cost. As a result the labor market is competitive in this industry and all
manufacturers pay the same wages. Since the market for this product is also competitive and the
value of the marginal product of labor equals one, the wage rate in this industry equals one.
Unlike the homogeneous-product sector, labor market frictions exist in the di⁄erentiated-product
industry. In particular, ￿rms in this industry face hiring costs of labor. A ￿-￿rm producing variety
! that seeks to employ h workers bears the hiring cost bh in terms of the homogeneous good, where
b depends on labor market conditions, to be discussed below. It follows that a worker cannot be
replaced without cost. Under these circumstances, a worker inside the ￿rm is not interchangeable
with a worker outside the ￿rm, and workers have bargaining power after being hired. We assume
that workers exploit this bargaining power in the wage determination process.
Following Stole and Zwiebel (1986), we assume that the workers and the ￿rm engage in multi-
lateral bargaining that leads to the distribution of revenue R = Q￿(￿￿￿) (￿h)
￿ according to Shapley
values. This results in a division of revenue between the ￿rm and its workers in the proportions
1=(1 + ￿) and ￿=(1 + ￿), respectively; that is, the ￿rm gets a share 1=(1 + ￿) of the revenue
while the workers get a share ￿=(1 + ￿).16 This result is derived under the assumption that at
the bargaining stage a worker￿ s outside option is unemployment, and the value of unemployment is
normalized to zero (no unemployment bene￿ts). Anticipating the outcome of this bargaining game,
a ￿-￿rm that wants to stay in the industry chooses an employment level that maximizes its share
of revenue minus hiring costs. That is, it chooses h to maximize (1 + ￿)
￿1 Q￿(￿￿￿) (￿h)
￿ ￿bh. The











15At this point we focus on a closed economy. When we extent the model to an open economy we shall revisit the
calculation of pro￿ts, accounting for exports.
16See Acemoglu, AntrÆs and Helpman (2007) for a proof.
6where ￿ ￿ ￿￿=(1￿￿) is an alternative measure of productivity. It follows from this solution that
more-productive ￿rms hire more workers, and all ￿rms hire more workers the lower the hiring cost
b is.
Next note that a ￿-￿rm has revenue R(￿) = Q￿(￿￿￿)￿1￿￿h(￿)￿, and the fraction ￿=(1 + ￿)
of this revenue is paid out as wages. Therefore the wage rate paid by a ￿-￿rm is w(￿) =
￿R(￿)=[(1 + ￿)h(￿)], which, using (4), implies
w(￿) = b: (5)
Evidently, all ￿rms pay the same wage, independently of their productivity.17
Operating pro￿ts of a ￿-￿rm are ￿ (￿) = (1 + ￿)
￿1 R(￿) ￿ bh(￿) ￿ fd, which, using R(￿) =












1￿￿￿ ￿ fd: (6)
Evidently, more-productive ￿rms have higher pro￿ts, and there is a cuto⁄ ￿d that satis￿es
￿ (￿d) = 0: (7)
If ￿d is in the interior of the support of the distribution of ￿, which we take to be the interval
[￿min;1), then entrants whose productivity is below ￿d choose to close shop and exit, while those
with ￿ above this cuto⁄ stay and make money. If, on the other hand, ￿d ￿ ￿min, then every
entrant stays in the industry. In either case a ￿rm that stays in the industry chooses an optimal
employment level and its revenue covers its hiring costs, ￿xed cost of manufacturing, and wages.
It follows that all ￿rms with ￿ above ￿m ￿ maxf￿d;￿ming end up manufacturing.
Let G(￿) be the cumulative distribution of ￿. Then a potential entrant￿ s expected operating
pro￿ts are
R 1
￿m ￿ (￿)dG(￿). A ￿rm enters the industry if these expected pro￿ts are at least as
large as the entry cost fe; otherwise it does not enter. Since entry is free, in an equilibrium with
positive entry Z 1
￿m
￿ (￿)dG(￿) = fe: (8)
Finally note that (1) can be used to compute the real consumption index Q from the output
levels of active ￿rms. A ￿-￿rm produces an output level q (￿) = ￿(1￿￿)=￿h(￿), where h(￿) is
17The analysis can be carried out with a more general hiring function, bh
￿, where ￿ > ￿. We discuss this more
general speci￿cation in the Appendix, where we show that for ￿ 6= 1 wages vary across ￿rms. In particular, when
￿ > 1, more-productive ￿rms pay higher wages. Since more-productive ￿rms are larger, both because they are more
productive and because they employ more workers, this also implies that larger ￿rms (as measured by output or
revenue) pay higher wages, in line with the evidence (see Katz and Summers, 1989). On the other hand, ￿ < 1 has
the counterfactual implication that larger ￿rms pay lower wages. It can also be shown that similar wage structures
emerge when multilateral bargaining is replaced with bilateral bargaining between the ￿rm and every worker, so that
the wage rate equals a fraction of the value of the marginal product of labor. In other words, the correlation between
￿rm size and wages is not driven by multilateral bargaining. Yashiv (2000) estimates ￿ > 1 from Israeli data, and
Merz and Yashiv (2007) estimate ￿ > 1 from U.S. data.












Each family has a ￿xed supply of L workers, and the family is the representative consumer whose
preferences were described in Section 2.1. We assume a continuum of identical families of this type,
and the measure of these families equals one.18
A family allocates workers to sectors￿ N workers to the di⁄erentiated-product sector and L￿N
to the homogeneous-product sector￿ which determines in which sector every worker searches for
work. Once committed to a sector, a worker cannot switch sectors. The homogeneous-product
sector has no labor market frictions and every job pays a wage of one. Therefore workers seeking
jobs in this sector expect to be employed with probability one and to obtain a wage w0 = 1.
Unlike the homogeneous-product sector, labor market frictions exist in the di⁄erentiated-product
sector. Some workers seeking jobs in this sector become unemployed when the sector￿ s aggregate





Therefore there is unemployment when H < N.
An individual searching for work in the di⁄erentiated-product sector expects to ￿nd a job with







where w(￿) is given in (5). It follows that the expected income of such a worker is ￿ wH=N. A
family allocates workers to sectors so as to maximize the family￿ s aggregate wage income. Therefore
a family chooses 0 < N < L only if ￿ wH=N = w0 = 1, so that the average income of the N workers
in the di⁄erentiated-product sector is the same as the average income of the L ￿ N workers in the





In other words, the aggregate wage bill in the di⁄erentiated-product sector￿ the right hand side of
(11)￿ just equals the number of workers searching for jobs in this sector.19
18When preferences are homothetic rather than quasi-linear, the family interpretation is useful but not essential.
See the Appendix for a discussion of homothetic preferences, risk aversion and ex-post inequality.
19One can generalize the model to allow wages to vary in the homogeneous product sector. A simple modi￿cation
would be the following: Suppose that the homogeneous-product sector uses labor and a sector-speci￿c input under
constant returns to scale. Then the wage rate in this sector, w0, is a decreasing function of labor employment, L￿N.
8We now interpret the parameter b of the cost-of-hiring function bh. As we have seen, N workers
search for work in the di⁄erentiated-product sector and only H of them ￿nd a job. Assuming that
to attract workers ￿rms have to post vacancies￿ which are then only partially ￿lled by individuals
searching for jobs￿ implies that b depends on the degree of tightness of the labor market, as
measured by x = H=N. This is a standard implication of the Mortensen-Pissarides model of search
and unemployment (see, for example, Pissarides (2000)). In particular, we assume that




where a > 1 and ￿ is positive.20 We consider a to be a measure of frictions in the labor market;
higher values of a can result from higher costs of vacancies or from less e¢ cient matching between
workers and ￿rms.21 We shall say that a country has better labor market institutions if it has a
smaller a.
This completes our description of the building blocks. In the next section we discuss equilibria
in a closed economy in order to clarify the impact of labor market frictions on unemployment. The
rate of unemployment is given by u = (N ￿ H)=L, which is a function of the number of individuals
searching for jobs in the di⁄erentiated-product sector and the employment level in this sector. This




(1 ￿ x); (13)
which is a weighted average of the sectoral unemployment rates, where the weights are the fractions
of workers seeking jobs in every sector. Since there is full employment in the homogeneous-product
sector, this weighted average equals the share of workers seeking jobs in the di⁄erentiated-product
sector, N=L, times the unemployment rate in that sector, 1￿x. It follows that the unemployment
rate can rise either because it rises in the di⁄erentiated-product sector or because more individuals
search for work in the sector with higher unemployment, which is the di⁄erentiated-product sector.
In a more general framework one would allow frictional unemployment in both sectors. Yet
in this case too the economy￿ s unemployment rate would be a weighted average of the sectoral
unemployment rates, with the fractions of workers seeking jobs in various sectors serving as weights.
In this event the left hand side of (11) has to be replaced with w0 (L ￿ N)N, where w0 (￿) is a decreasing function.
The other equilibrium conditions do not change.
20We focus on the case a > 1. For a = 1 our equilibrium system describes a full-employment economy. Our
description of an equilibrium is not complete for the case a < 1. One way to handle the case a < 1 is to assume
that whenever there is a tendency toward overemployment, ￿rms o⁄er workers a ￿xed payment in order to join the
￿rm and after they join there is bargaining of the type described in the text. In this event there exists a well de￿ned
equilibrium with full employment.
21To justify this formulation, let a1V
￿N
1￿￿, a1 > 0, 0 < ￿ < 1, be a matching function, where V represents
aggregate vacancies and N represents the number of individuals searching for work. Then H = a1V
￿N
1￿￿, which
implies V=H = a
￿1=￿
1 x




vacancies. Next assume that the cost of posting v vacancies is a2v in terms of the homogeneous good, where a2 > 0
is a parameter. Then a ￿rm that wants to hire h workers has to bear the hiring cost ax
￿h, where a = a2=a
1=￿
1 and
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ > 0. That is, a is rising with the cost of posting vacancies, a2, and declining in the productivity of
the matching technology, a1.
9As a result, changes in the rate of unemployment would result either from changes in sectoral
unemployment rates or from the relocation of workers across sectors. Our simple structure captures
these channels of in￿ uence, and it is analytically more convenient.
3 Equilibrium in a Closed Economy
To characterize the equilibrium of a closed economy, substitute the equations for the employment
levels, wages and pro￿ts of individual ￿rms, (4)-(6), into the equilibrium conditions (7)-(11). The
resulting ￿ve equations together with (12) can then be solved for the cuto⁄ ￿d, the measure of
tightness in the labor market x, real consumption Q, the number of entrants M, employment H,
and the number of individuals searching for work in the di⁄erentiated-product sector, N.









These imply that there is equilibrium unemployment (i.e., x < 1 whenever a > 1); tightness
in the labor market and wages in the di⁄erentiated-product sector depend only on labor market
institutions; and countries with better labor market institutions have tighter labor markets and
lower wages in the di⁄erentiated-product sector.22 Importantly, features of the economy other than
labor market frictions, such as entry costs or the distribution of productivity, impact neither x nor
w(￿).23
Unemployment emerges because workers search for jobs in the high-wage high-unemployment
sector, and given the economy￿ s structural features, it is not possible to ￿ll these high-wage jobs
without unemployment. As a result, unemployment plays an allocative role. Nevertheless, it can
be shown that our equilibrium is generally not constrained Pareto-e¢ cient (due to bargaining and
search-and-matching externalities), in the sense that a planner facing the same frictions as the
market can improve the allocation of resources and raise welfare.
Now consider an equilibrium with ￿m = ￿d > ￿min (we shall see below the circumstances
under which this type of equilibrium emerges). Then, using the pro￿t equation (6), the equilibrium










The left hand side of this equation is declining in ￿d. As a result, if there exists a ￿d > ￿min that




22Recall that we measure wages in terms of the homogeneous product, which is the numeraire; real wages depend
also on the price index of the di⁄erentiated product (see Section 5.3).
23We show in the Appendix that with the more general hiring function bh
￿, ￿ 6= 1, equilibrium tightness in the
labor market and wages depend on those characteristics.
10where ￿ ￿ is the unconditional mean of ￿.24 In this type of equilibrium the cuto⁄￿d does not depend
on labor market institutions; it depends on the entry cost, the ￿xed production cost and the shape
of the productivity distribution. The larger the entry cost the lower the cuto⁄ is, and the larger
the ￿xed production cost the higher the cuto⁄ is.

















Therefore, in economies with better labor market institutions, b is smaller and Q is higher. Since
the expected wage of every worker equals one, independently of labor market institutions, aggregate
income and expenditure is E = L, and welfare is higher the higher Q is.25 It follows that families
are better o⁄ in countries with better labor market institutions.







It follows that economies with better labor market institutions, which have higher real consumption











This condition implies that economies with better labor market institutions, which have more
￿rms in the di⁄erentiated-product sector, also have more workers searching for jobs in this sector.
Moreover, the number of searching workers per ￿rm, N=M, is independent of labor market frictions.
Since x is higher in countries with better labor market institutions, H is also higher in countries
with better labor market institutions and proportionately more so than N or M.
Now consider the rate of unemployment (13). Proportional di⁄erentiation of this equation yields




24Note that the left hand side of the free-entry condition equals fd[
￿￿ ￿=￿min
￿
￿ 1] for ￿d = ￿min, it is declining in
￿d for ￿d > ￿min, and it goes to zero as ￿d ! 1. Therefore there exists a unique solution ￿d > ￿min if and only if ￿￿ ￿=￿min
￿
> 1+fe=fd. In case the last inequality is not satis￿ed, the equilibrium of the closed economy has ￿d ￿ ￿min.
The distribution of productivity can be approximated with a Pareto distribution, for which G(￿) = 1 ￿ (￿min=￿)
k,
where ￿ ￿ ￿min and k > 2 (the latter is required for a ￿nite variance). In this case the mean of the distribution is
￿ ￿ = ￿mink=(k ￿ 1). Therefore in this case
￿￿ ￿=￿min
￿
> 1+fe=fd if and only if k=(k ￿ 1) > 1+fe=fd, i.e., if and only
if the shape parameter k is small enough, and this is possible only when fe < fd (otherwise k=(k ￿ 1) ￿ 1 + fe=fd
for all k > 2). However, a smaller value of k implies a larger variance of the productivity distribution. It follows that
for fe < fd some entering ￿rms choose to exit if and only if the distribution of productivity is su¢ ciently dispersed.





Figure 1: Unemployment as a function of labor market frictions
where a hat over a variable indicates a proportional rate of change, e.g., ^ u = du=u. Evidently,
improvements in labor market institutions raise x and thereby reduce the rate of unemployment,
by reducing the rate of unemployment in the di⁄erentiated-product sector. On the other hand,
improvements in labor market institutions attract more workers to the di⁄erentiated-product sector,
i.e., N rises, thereby raising the rate of unemployment. The former dominates if and only if26




This condition is satis￿ed for small values of b and it is violated for high values of b. As a result,
improvements in labor market institutions reduce unemployment when the rigidities in the labor
market are small to begin with (i.e., b = a1=(1+￿) is small), and they raise unemployment when
the labor market rigidities are high. This relationship between b and unemployment is depicted
in Figure 1; unemployment starts at zero when b = 1, rises with b until it reaches a peak at an
intermediate level of labor market frictions, and declines afterwards towards zero.27 Unemployment
is zero when b = 1 because in this case x = 1, so that there is no unemployment in the di⁄erentiated-
product sector. And unemployment equals zero when b ! 1 because in this case N ! 0, so
that no individuals search for jobs in the di⁄erentiated-product sector. Importantly, however,
26Proof: Recall that ^ N = ^ M. Next note that (15) implies ^ Q = [￿￿=(￿ ￿ ￿)]^ b while (16) implies ^ M = ￿ ^ Q.


















Since an improvement in labor market institutions reduces b, unemployment declines if and only if the condition in
the text holds.
27Two assumptions are important for the hump-shaped response of unemployment. First, ￿ > 0 ensures that a fall
in b, which decreases the sectoral unemployment rate, also leads to an increase in N. Second, the assumption that
the unemployment rate in the homogenous product sector is lower than in the di⁄erentiated product sector ensures
that shifting resources to the latter increases the economy-wide rate of unemployment.
12improvements in labor market institutions raise welfare, independently of whether unemployment
rises or declines.28
We summarize the main ￿ndings of this section in the following29
Proposition 1 Improvements in labor market institutions: (i) reduce wages in the di⁄erentiated-
product sector; (ii) raise M and N by the same factor of proportionality; (iii) raise H proportion-
ately more, thereby tightening the labor market; (iv) reduce the rate of unemployment when labor
market frictions are low and raise the rate of unemployment when labor market frictions are high;
and (v) raise welfare independently of the impact on unemployment.
4 Open Economies: Preliminaries
In this section we extend the model to a world of two countries, labeled A and B, that trade with
each other. Our main interest is in the impact of varying labor market institutions. For this reason
we assume that the two countries are identical, except for rigidities in their labor markets. We let
aj be the measure of labor market frictions in country j, j = A;B, and we use subscript j to denote
variables of country j that are not common to both countries.
Each one of the two countries has the same structural features as the closed economy. Now,
however, consumers can purchase foreign products and ￿rms can export. Following Melitz (2003),
we assume that the di⁄erentiated-product sector bears a ￿xed cost of exporting fx in terms of the
homogeneous product. In addition, it bears a variable cost of exporting of the melting iceberg type:
￿ > 1 units have to be exported for one unit to arrive in the foreign country. As is common in models
with home market e⁄ects, we assume that there are no trade frictions in the homogenous-product
sector.
If a country-j ￿rm with productivity ￿ chooses to serve only the domestic market, then its
operating pro￿ts are given by (6), where Q on the right hand side is replaced with Qj and b is
replaced with bj. If, however, such a ￿rm chooses to serve the foreign market as well as the home
market, then its operating pro￿ts can be derived as follows: Suppose that the ￿rm hires hj workers
who then produce an output ￿(1￿￿)=￿hj. Once the ￿rm has paid the ￿xed export cost, it allocates
28We shall use the derived parameter b = a
1=(1+￿) instead of the more primitive parameter a as our measure of
labor market frictions, because this is notationally more convenient. In a more general framework, in which b might
depend not only on a, it would be necessary to use a rather than b.
29In the text we focus on equilibria with ￿d > ￿min. Note, however, that equilibria with ￿d ￿ ￿min yield similar
results. To see why, consider equilibria for
￿￿ ￿=￿min
￿
￿ 1+fe=fd, in which case ￿m = ￿min ￿ ￿d. When ￿d ￿ ￿min
all entrants produce, and we can substitute the pro￿t function (6) into the free-entry condition (8) to obtain





This equation provides a solution to Q; as labor market institutions improve b declines and therefore Q rises. Com-
paring this equation to (15) one observes that the impact of changes in b on changes in Q are the same in both cases.
Proceeding from here step by step with the analysis conducted for the case
￿￿ ￿=￿min
￿
> 1+fe=fd, we reach the same
conclusions, i.e., improvements in labor market institutions raise N and M by the same factor of proportionality,
they raise H proportionately more, and they reduce unemployment if and only if b < 1 + (￿ ￿ ￿)=(￿￿) holds.















In this speci￿cation (￿j) is the index of the country other than j while pdj and pxj are producer
prices of home and foreign sales, respectively. Note that when exports are priced at pxj, consumers
in the foreign country pay an e⁄ective price of ￿pxj due to the variable export costs. Under
these circumstances they demand Q￿(￿￿￿)=(1￿￿) (￿pxj)
￿1=(1￿￿) consumption units. To deliver these
consumption units the supplier has to manufacture qxj units, as shown above.
Such a producer maximizes total revenue when marginal revenues are equalized across markets.
In the case of constant elasticity of demand functions this requires equalization of producer prices,


















is the e⁄ective demand level facing an exporting ￿rm from country j. Such a ￿rm receives the
fraction 1=(1 + ￿) of this revenue when it bargains with its workers. For this reason it chooses
employment hj to maximize (1 + ￿)
￿1 Rj ￿ bjhj, which yields the employment level (4) with Q
replaced by Zj and b replaced by bj.
To simplify notation, let Ij (￿) be an indicator variable that equals one if a ￿-￿rm in country
j exports and zero if it does not. Then the employment level of a ￿-￿rm in country j can be
decomposed into30
hj (￿) = hdj (￿) + Ij (￿)hxj (￿);
where hdj (￿) represents employment for domestic sales, hxj (￿) represents employment for export
sales, and


























> > > =
> > > ;
(17)
Moreover, a country-j ￿rm with productivity ￿ pays wages31
wj (￿) = bj; (18)
30This convenient decomposition is possible with ￿ = 1 in the hiring function but not with ￿ 6= 1.
31Recall that the wage rate equals the fraction ￿=(1 + ￿) of revenue divided by h. Using (17) this implies a wage
rate equal to bj, which is independent of the ￿rm￿ s export status. That is, all ￿rms, exporters and nonexporters alike,
pay equal wages. This result changes when the cost of hiring is bh
￿ and ￿ 6= 1. In particular, for ￿ > 1 exporters pay
higher wages than nonexporters (see Appendix). Fariæas and Mart￿n-Marcos (2007) provide evidence to the e⁄ect
that exporting ￿rms pay higher wages.
14and its operating pro￿ts are
￿j (￿) = ￿dj (￿) + Ij (￿)￿xj (￿);
where ￿dj (￿) represents operating pro￿ts from domestic sales, ￿xj (￿) represents operating pro￿ts
from export sales, and








j ￿ ￿ fd;











(￿j) ￿ ￿ fx:
9
> > > =
> > > ;
(19)
It follows that exporting is pro￿table if and only if ￿xj (￿) ￿ 0, i.e., there exists a cuto⁄productivity
level, ￿xj, de￿ned by
￿xj (￿xj) = 0; (20)
such that all ￿rms with productivity above this cuto⁄ export (provided they choose to stay in the
industry) and all ￿rms with productivity below it do not export. Firms with low productivity that
do not export may nevertheless make money from supplying the domestic market. For this to be
the case, their productivity has to be at least as high as ￿dj, implicitly de￿ned by
￿dj (￿dj) = 0: (21)
We shall consider equilibria in which ￿xj > ￿dj > ￿min (conditions for such equilibria are discussed
below), i.e., equilibria with high-productivity ￿rms that can pro￿tably export and supply the
domestic market, indermediate-productivity ￿rms that cannot pro￿tably export but can pro￿tably
supply the domestic market, and low-productivity ￿rms that cannot make money and exit. Under






￿xj (￿)dG(￿) = fe: (22)
The ￿rst integral represents expected pro￿ts from domestic sales while the second integral represents
expected pro￿ts from foreign sales.
We next use (1) to compute the real consumption index Qj from the output levels of active
￿rms. A ￿-￿rm produces an output level qdj (￿) = ￿(1￿￿)=￿hdj (￿) for domestic sales if ￿ ￿ ￿dj
and an output level qxj (￿) = ￿(1￿￿)=￿hxj (￿) for export if ￿ ￿ ￿xj. Foreign buyers consume only
qxj (￿)=￿ units of these exportables due to the variable trade costs. Therefore, if a measure Mj of



































As in the closed economy, the aggregate wage bill in the di⁄erentiated-product sector equals the
number of workers searching for jobs in this sector, so that the average income of these workers
equals one.
Finally, we assume that
bj = ajx￿

















It follows that a country￿ s labor market frictions uniquely determine its wage and labor market
tightness in the di⁄erentiated-product sector, just like in the closed economy. Every country, thus,




(1 ￿ xj): (27)
This completes our description of the two-country world.
5 Trade, Welfare and Productivity
In this section we explore channels through which the two countries are interdependent. For this
purpose we organize the discussion around two main themes: the impact of a country￿ s labor market
frictions on its trade partner, and the di⁄erential e⁄ects of trade impediments on countries with
di⁄erent labor market institutions.
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(28)

















dG(￿) = fe for j = A;B: (29)
This form of the free-entry condition generates a curve in the (￿dj;￿xj) space on which every
country￿ s cuto⁄s have to be located, because this curve depends only on the common cost variables
and on the common distribution of productivity. Moreover, this curve is downward-sloping, as
depicted by FF in Figure 2, and each country has to be located above the 45o line for the export
cuto⁄ to be higher than the domestic cuto⁄. Note, from (28), that in a symmetric equilibrium, in
which Qj = Q(￿j), the export cuto⁄ is higher if and only if ￿￿=(1￿￿)fx > fd, which is the condition
required for exporters to be more productive in Melitz (2003). We assume that this condition is
satis￿ed for all ￿ ￿ 1, in which case fx ￿ fd.
Also note that as the export cuto⁄ goes to in￿nity, the domestic cuto⁄ approaches the cuto⁄ of
a closed economy, which is represented by ￿c
d in the ￿gure. It therefore follows that if the cuto⁄














; j = A;B: (30)
Equations (29) and (30) can be used for solving the four cuto⁄s as functions of labor market frictions
and cost parameters. As is evident, the cuto⁄s do not depend on the levels of labor market rigidities,
only on their relative size.
Our primary interest is in the impact of ￿, bA, and bB on the trading economies. We therefore
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It is straightforward to show that ￿ > 0.34 Therefore an increase in a country￿ s relative labor
32We showed in the previous section that ￿
c
d > ￿min if and only if
￿￿ ￿=￿min
￿
> 1 + fe=fd, which we assume to be
satis￿ed.
33 We show below that ￿dj=￿2 is average revenue per entering ￿rm from domestic sales in country j and ￿xj=￿2
is average revenue from exports per entering ￿rm. Therefore ￿dj represents average pro￿ts per entering ￿rm from
domestic sales and ￿xj represents average pro￿ts per entering ￿rm from exporting.
34 Proof: To show that ￿ > 0, observe that ￿xj > ￿dj implies ￿dj=￿xj > (fd=￿dj)=(fx=￿xj) for j = A;B. Using
these inequalities together with (30) then implies ￿dA￿dB=(￿xA￿xB) > ￿
2￿=(1￿￿) > 1, in which case ￿ > 0. Also
note that ￿dA￿dB=(￿xA￿xB) > ￿

















Figure 2: Cuto⁄s in a trading equilibrium
market frictions, say bj=b(￿j), raises the country￿ s export cuto⁄ and reduces its domestic cuto⁄, in
addition to reducing the foreign country￿ s export cuto⁄ and raising the foreign country￿ s domestic
cuto⁄. Moreover, an increase in the trade cost raises the export cuto⁄ and reduces the domestic
cuto⁄ of country j if and only if ￿d(￿j) > ￿x(￿j). We will shortly show that, indeed, ￿dj > ￿xj in
both countries in this type of equilibrium. Therefore an increase in ￿ raises the export cuto⁄ and
reduces the domestic cuto⁄ in both countries.
These insights can be conveniently summarized with the aid of Figure 2. When the two countries
have the same labor market rigidities, i.e., bA = bB, both have cuto⁄s at point S in the ￿gure,
which is the intersection of ray bA = bB with FF.35 If instead country A has worse labor market
institutions, then A￿ s cuto⁄s are at point A while B￿ s cuto⁄s are at point B.36 The larger the gap
in labor market frictions between these countries, the higher A is on the FF curve and the lower B
is. Improvements in the trading environment, which reduce ￿, shift down points A and B. These
results have important implications for the variation of outcome variables across countries, as well
as for the international transmission of shocks, that we discuss below. One immediate implication
is that Qj is higher in the ￿ exible country.37
For our set of equations to describe an equilibrium, it is necessary to ensure positive entry of
￿rms in both countries, i.e., that Mj > 0 for j = A;B. This places restrictions on the permissible
di⁄erence in labor market rigidities. It proves useful to derive these restrictions in the following
satis￿ed for both countries in a symmetric equilibrium with bA = bB and hence by continuity in its vicinity.





￿d. Therefore its slope is
￿
￿=(1￿￿)fx=fd > 1.
36As a convention, we choose country A to be the rigid country and B to be the ￿ exible country.
37Proof: Equation (28) implies (QA=QB)
(￿￿￿)=(1￿￿) = (￿dA=￿dB)(bB=bA)
￿=(1￿￿). It follows that if, say, B is the
￿ exible country, then bB=bA < 1, and from the previous analysis, ￿dA=￿dB < 1. As a result, QA=QB < 1.
18way: Substitute the employment levels (17) into (23), and use (28) to obtain38
￿2Q
￿
j = ￿djMj + ￿x(￿j)M(￿j):












It is straightforward to show that ￿dA > ￿xA in the rigid country A.39 Under these circumstances
(32) implies MB > 0, because Qj is larger in the ￿ exible country; (32) also implies that a necessary
condition for MA > 0 is ￿dB=￿xB > (QB=QA)
￿ > 1. In other words, in this type of equilibrium we
have ￿dj > ￿xj for j = A;B. Moreover, the previous results on the cuto⁄s imply that ￿dj is smaller
and ￿xj is larger in the ￿ exible country. We therefore have
Lemma 1 In equilibrium with incomplete specialization, ￿dj > ￿xj in both countries. Moreover,
￿dj is smaller and ￿xj is larger in the ￿exible country.
Equation (32) can also be used to calculate the di⁄erence in entry. In particular,












Lemma 2 Mj is larger in the ￿exible country.
We show in the Appendix that for every ￿ > 1 there exists a unique ratio bA=bB, say ￿ b(￿) > 1,
such that Mj > 0 for j = A;B if and only if bA=bB < ￿ b(￿), where A is the rigid country. When
bA=bB ￿ ￿ b(￿), the rigid country specializes in homogeneous goods. Evidently, ￿ b(￿) provides a
bound on di⁄erences in labor market institutions that support equilibria which have production
of di⁄erentiated products in both countries. Given ￿, this limit can be depicted by point C on
the FF curve in Figure 2, which is located between the bA = bB ray and the 45o line, such that
the equilibrium point of the ￿ exible country, point B, has to be above C for both countries to be
incompletely specialized.41
38Using the interpretation of the ￿s in footnote 33, this equation can be interpreted as Q
￿
j equals the revenue of
domestic ￿rms from domestic sales in country j, ￿djMj=￿2, plus the revenue of foreign ￿rms from domestic sales in
country j, ￿x(￿j)M(￿j)=￿2. This is consistent with the fact that Q
￿
j = PjQj, where Pj is the ideal consumer price
index of di⁄erentiated products in country j.
39Since ￿ > 0, it is necessary to have ￿dj > ￿xj in at least one country. However, the rigid country A has a
higher export cuto⁄ and a lower domestic cuto⁄. Therefore ￿dA > ￿xA in the rigid country. Moreover, as shown in
footnote 34, ￿dB > ￿xB in the ￿ exible country as well, as long as labor market rigidities do not di⁄er much across
countries.
40Proof: Let B be the ￿ exible country. Then ￿dB < ￿dA, ￿xA < ￿xB because the ￿ exible country has a lower export
cuto⁄ and a higher domestic cuto⁄, and QB > QA, in which case MB > MA.
41In the Appendix we also analyze equilibria with specialization when bA=bB ￿ ￿ b(￿).
195.1 Welfare
We are interested to know how labor market institutions and trade frictions a⁄ect welfare, and
in particular their di⁄erential e⁄ects on the welfare of the ￿ exible and rigid countries. We have
already shown that Qj is higher in the ￿ exible country. Now combine the formulas for changes in







￿￿d(￿j) (￿xj + ￿dj)^ bj + ￿xj
￿
￿x(￿j) + ￿d(￿j)







This equation has a number of implications. First, it shows that an improvement in a country￿ s
labor market institutions raises its real consumption index Qj and therefore its welfare, but it
reduces the trade partner￿ s welfare.42 On the other side, a simultaneous improvement in the labor
market institutions of both countries, at a common rate ^ bA = ^ bB, raises everybody￿ s welfare.43
Second, in view of Lemma 1, a reduction in trade impediments raises welfare in both countries. We
summarize these ￿ndings in44
Proposition 2 (i) Welfare is higher in the ￿exible country. (ii) An improvement in labor market
institutions in one country raises its welfare and reduces the welfare of its trade partner. (iii) A si-
multaneous improvement in labor market institutions in both countries, with ^ bA = ^ bB, raises welfare
in both of them. (iv) A reduction of trade impediments raises welfare in both countries and Qj rises
proportionately more in the ￿exible country.
The last part of this proposition establishes that both countries gain from trade, because autarky is
attained when ￿ ! 1.45 Moreover, we show in the Appendix that both countries gain from trade
when the di⁄erence in labor market institutions is large enough to e⁄ect an equilibrium in which
the rigid country specializes in the production of homogeneous products. We therefore have
Proposition 3 Both countries gain from trade.
This proposition is interesting, because it is well known that gains from trade are not ensured
in economies with nonconvexities and distortions (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Moreover,
in addition to the standard nonconvexities and distortions that exist in models of monopolistic
competition, our model contains frictions in labor markets, which makes the gains-from-trade result
even more remarkable.
42Recall that income in terms of homogeneous goods equals L in every country and that country j￿ s welfare is
higher the higher Qj is.




= ￿￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) < 0.























Under these circumstances ^ Qj > ^ Q(￿j) when either ^ bj < ^ b(￿j) or (by Lemma 1) ^ ￿ < 0.
45The following is a direct proof of the gains-from-trade argument: We have seen that the domestic cuto⁄ is higher
in every country in the trading equilibrium than in autarky. Equations (15) and (28) then imply that Qj is higher in
every country in the trading equilibrium.
20Another interesting result is that a country harms its trade partner by improving its own labor
market institutions, despite the positive terms-of-trade e⁄ect enjoyed by the trade partner. In this
framework lower labor market rigidities improve the competitiveness of home ￿rms, which leads to
the crowding-out of foreign ￿rms from the di⁄erentiated-product sector, lowering thereby the trade
partner￿ s welfare.
5.2 Trade Structure
In order to study the structure of trade, consider the revenue from exports of ￿rms in the di⁄erentiated-
product sector. The demand function (3) implies that the export revenue of a ￿-￿rm in country j
is




Aggregating this revenue over all exporting ￿rms yields exports of di⁄erentiated products from j

































From previous sections we know that the country with better labor market institutions has a higher
domestic cuto⁄ ￿dj and a lower exporting cuto⁄ ￿xj. From Lemmas 1 and 2 we know that this
country also has a larger ￿xj and more ￿rms. Therefore this country has both a larger fraction
of exporting ￿rms and a larger value of exports of di⁄erentiated products Xj, in which case it
exports di⁄erentiated products on net. Under these circumstances, the ￿ exible country imports
homogeneous products.
As in the standard Helpman-Krugman model of trade in di⁄erentiated products, there is intra-
industry trade. We can therefore decompose the volume of trade into intra-industry and intersec-
toral trade. Let country A be the rigid country and let B be the ￿ exible country. Then because
trade is balanced, the total volume of trade equals 2XB and the volume of intra-industry trade


























Equations (31) and (33) then imply that the share of intra-industry trade is smaller the larger the
ratio bA=bB is.
The results on trade structure are summarized in
Proposition 4 (i) A larger fraction of ￿rms export in the ￿exible country. (ii) The ￿exible country
exports di⁄erentiated products on net and imports homogeneous goods. (iii) The share of intra-
industry trade is smaller the larger the proportional gap in labor market institutions is.
Evidently, labor market institutions impact comparative advantage, and variation in labor market
frictions feeds intersectoral trade. The model yields testable implications about trade ￿ ows.46
5.3 Productivity and Price Levels
In this section we discuss the implications of our model for total factor productivity (TFP) and
price levels in countries with di⁄erent labor market institutions. Alternative measures of TFP can
be used to characterize the e¢ ciency of production. We choose to focus on one such measure￿
the employment-weighted average of ￿rm-level productivity levels￿ which is commonly used in the
















Recall that qzj(￿) = ￿(1￿￿)=￿hzj(￿). Therefore, TFPj equals the total production of di⁄erentiated
products divided by employment in the di⁄erentiated-product sector.48 Note that TFPj measures
productivity in the di⁄erentiated-product sector only, rather than in the entire economy, and the
productivity in the homogeneous-product sector is constant and equal to one. We discuss in the
Appendix a productivity measure that accounts for the sectoral composition of resources.
46Additionally, under Pareto-distributed productivity, the model also implies that the volume of trade is larger the
larger the gap in labor market rigidities is and the smaller the trade impediments are (See Appendix for Section 6.3).
47This corresponds to the measure analyzed by Melitz (2003) in the appendix. Note that Melitz uses revenue to
weight ￿rm productivity levels. However, in equilibrium, revenue is proportional to employment, in which case his
and our productivity indexes are the same.
48An alternative, and potentially more desirable, measure of productivity, would divide output by the number of
workers searching for jobs in the di⁄erentiated product sector, Nj. This measure is always smaller than TFPj by the
factor xj. It follows that labor market liberalization has an additional positive e⁄ect on this measure of productivity
as compared to the measure used in the main text.




= $dj’dj + $xj’xj; (35)
where $dj = ￿dj=(￿dj+￿xj) is the share of domestic sales in revenue and $xj is the share of exports,
with $xj = 1 ￿ $dj, j = A;B. Moreover,





; z = d;x;
where ’dj represents the average productivity of ￿rms that serve only the home market and ’xj
represents the average productivity of exporting ￿rms. It follows that aggregate productivity equals
the weighted average of the productivity of ￿rms that serve only the home market and the produc-
tivity of ￿rms that export, with the revenue shares serving as weights. We show in the Appendix
that ’(￿) is an increasing function. Therefore average productivity is higher among exporters, i.e.,
’xj > ’dj.
Condition (35) implies that the cuto⁄s f￿dj;￿xjg uniquely determine the TFPjs, because $zj
and ’zj depend only on ￿zj. Moreover, since the two cuto⁄s are linked by the free-entry condition
(29), TFPj can be expressed as a function of the domestic cuto⁄￿dj, independently of labor market
and trade frictions. This implies that in the closed economy TFPj is not responsive to changes
in labor market institutions, because ￿c
d is uniquely determined by the ￿xed costs of entry and
production and the ex ante productivity distribution.49
Productivity TFPj is higher in the trading equilibrium than in autarky, because ’(￿xj) >
’(￿dj) > ’(￿c
d), and in autarky $c
x = 0. That is, the average productivity of exporters and
nonexporters alike is higher in the trading equilibrium than is the average productivity of ￿rms in
autarky. In addition, trade reallocates revenue to the exporting ￿rms, which are on average more
productive. For both these reasons trade raises TFPj. We summarize these results in
Proposition 5 (i) In the closed economy, TFPj does not depend on the quality of labor market
institutions; (ii) TFPj is higher in any trading equilibrium than in autarky.
Next recall that in an open economy a reduction of trade costs raises the domestic cuto⁄ and
reduces the export cuto⁄. In addition, an improvement in labor market institutions in country
j raises ￿dj and ￿x(￿j) and reduces ￿d(￿j) and ￿xj. Finally, a simultaneous and proportional
improvement in labor market institutions in both countries (i.e., ^ bA = ^ bB < 0) leaves all these
cuto⁄s unchanged (see (31)).
How do changes in labor market frictions impact productivity? In the case in which the labor
market frictions decline in both countries by the same factor of proportionality, the answer is
49However, changes in labor market institutions lead to the reallocation of resources from the homogenous product
to the di⁄erentiated product sector, which raises the economy-wide productivity level if and only if ’
c
d > 1 (see
Appendix).
23simple: the TFPjs do not change. As long as productivity is measured with respect to the number
of employed workers rather than the number of workers searching for jobs, measured sectoral
productivity levels are not sensitive to the absolute levels of frictions in the labor markets; only the
relative level of these frictions matters. This result points to a shortcoming of this TFP measure. We
nevertheless continue the analysis with this measure, because it is commonly used in the literature.
A shock that raises the domestic cuto⁄ ￿dj and reduces the export cuto⁄ ￿xj a⁄ects TFPj
through three channels. First, the reallocation of revenue from ￿rms that serve only the home
market to exporters raises the weight on the productivity of exporters, $xj, which raises in turn
TFPj. Second, some least-e¢ cient ￿rms exit the industry, thereby raising the average productivity
of ￿rms that sell only in the home market, ’dj, which raises TFPj. Finally, some ￿rms with
productivity below ￿xj begin to export, thereby reducing the average productivity of exporters,
’xj, which reduces TFPj.50
The presence of the third e⁄ect, which goes against the ￿rst two, does not permit us to sign
the impact of single-country labor market reforms on productivity; in general, productivity may
increase or decrease. The sharp result for the comparison of autarky to trade derives from the fact
that, in a move from autarky to trade, the third e⁄ect is nil. In the Appendix, we provide su¢ cient
conditions for productivity to be monotonically rising with declines in bj. In this section, however,
we limit our discussion to the case of Pareto-distributed productivity draws, which yields sharp
predictions.












where k > 1=￿ and hence k > (1￿￿)=￿ is required for TFPj to be ￿nite. As a result, TFPj is
higher the higher ￿dj is (and the lower ￿xj is). It follows that productivity is higher in the ￿ exible
country, and an improvement in a country￿ s labor market institutions raises its productivity and
reduces the productivity of the country￿ s trade partner. An implication of this result is that the gap
in productivity between the ￿ exible and rigid countries is increasing in bA=bB, the relative quality
of their labor market institutions. These results are summarized in the following
Proposition 6 Let ￿ be Pareto-distributed with a shape parameter k > 1=￿. Then: (i) TFPj is
higher in the ￿exible country; (ii) an improvement in labor market institutions in country j raises
TFPj and reduces TFP(￿j); (iii) a reduction of trade costs raises TFPj in both countries.
We next discuss variations in price levels. Since the price of the homogenous good is normalized
to one and it is the same in both countries, the overall price level is monotonically increasing in the
50Formally, this decomposition can be represented as [ TFP j = ^ $xj(’xj ￿ ’dj) + (1 ￿ $xj)^ ’dj + $xj^ ’xj with
^ $xj > 0, ^ ’dj > 0 and ^ ’xj < 0.
51In this calculation, an increase in ￿dj is accompanied by a decrease in ￿xj in order to satisfy the free-entry
condition (29). See Appendix for derivation of this equation.
24price index of the di⁄erentiated product, Pj. In particular, the indirect utility function (2) implies
that the minimum cost of attaining a utility level equal to one is










an expression that represents the ideal price index. Using this ideal price index the real exchange
rate of country j is ￿j = P(￿j)=Pj. It therefore follows that the real exchange rate is increasing in
P(￿j) and declining in Pj.
Now recall that, in equilibrium, Pj = Q
￿(1￿￿)
j and that Qj is higher in the ￿ exible country.
As a result, the ￿ exible country has a lower price level and a higher real exchange rate. This
observation together with Proposition 6 implies that a country with higher productivity (i.e., the
same productivity in the homogenous-product sector and higher productivity in the di⁄erentiated-
product sector) has a lower price level and a higher real exchange rate. This prediction contrasts
with the classical Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect, which suggests that countries with higher productivity
have higher price levels and lower real exchange rates.52 In other words, our model embodies
an anti-Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect, which emanates from the fact that higher frictions in the labor
market lead to both lower productivity and higher prices.53
We summarize these ￿ndings in the following
Proposition 7 Let ￿ be Pareto-distributed with a shape parameter k > 1=￿. Then the price level
is lower and the real exchange rate is higher in the (more-productive) ￿exible country.
6 Unemployment
Before discussing the variation of unemployment across countries with di⁄erent labor market insti-
tutions in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, we ￿rst examine the determinants of unemployment in a world of
symmetric countries.
6.1 Symmetric Countries
We study in this section countries with bA = bB = b, in order to understand how changes in
the common level of labor market frictions and the common level of variable trade costs a⁄ect
unemployment. In such equilibria, the cuto⁄s ￿d and ￿x, the consumption index Q, the number
of entrants M, the number of individuals searching for jobs in the di⁄erentiated-product sector N,
the number of workers employed in that sector H, and the rate of unemployment u are the same in
both countries. From the previous section we know that two symmetric economies are at the same
point on the FF curve in Figure 2 (point S), the location of this point is invariant to the common
52See Ghironi and Melitz (2006) for a detailed analysis of the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect in the baseline Melitz model
and in its dynamic extension.
53Note that there is no evidence for the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect within the group of OECD countries (see Rogo⁄,
1996).
25level of labor market frictions, and this point is higher the larger ￿ is. Moreover, (33) implies that
Q is lower the higher are either b or ￿, and a lower value of Q leads to lower welfare. In other
words, higher frictions in trade or labor markets reduce welfare.
In order to assess the impact of labor market rigidities on unemployment, we need to know
their quantitative impact on Q. For this reason we use (33) to obtain










Next substitute the employment levels (17) into (23) and (25) to obtain N = ￿
(1￿￿)=￿
1 Q￿, which
together with the previous equation yields










Finally, from (26) and the unemployment equation (27) we have ^ u = ^ N +^ b=(b ￿ 1), which together















It is evident from this formula that labor market frictions impact unemployment in the symmet-
ric case in exactly the same way they impact unemployment in a closed economy. That is, better
labor market institutions (lower b) reduce unemployment if and only if labor market frictions are
low to begin with. If these frictions are high, however, improvements in labor market institutions
raise the rate of unemployment. In fact, the relationship between b and the rate of unemployment
has the same inverted U shape in an open economy as it has in a closed economy (see Figure 1).
It is also easy to show that lower frictions in labor markets lead to increased entry of ￿rms M, an
increase in N proportionately to M, and a more than proportional increase in employment H. This
similarity with the closed economy emanates from the fact that the domestic and export cuto⁄s do
not change with this type of labor market frictions. As a result, the fractions of exporting ￿rms do
not change either.54
Now consider changes in trade impediments. As the formula for changes in the rate of un-
employment shows, a lower trade cost ￿ raises the rate of unemployment, independently of the
common level of frictions in labor markets or the initial level of trade frictions. Since the lowering
of trade costs raises welfare, this means that welfare and unemployment respond in opposite direc-
tions to changes in trade costs. Since reducing trade impediments does not a⁄ect tightness in labor
markets, the rise in unemployment is a consequence of an increase in N and H by the same factor
of proportionality. Finally, lower trade costs reduce the export cuto⁄s and increase the domestic
cuto⁄s, thereby raising the fractions of exporting ￿rms.
We summarize the main ￿ndings of this section in
54In a symmetric world all trade is intra-industry trade.
26Proposition 8 In a symmetric world economy: (i) improvements in labor market institutions,
common to both countries, reduce unemployment if and only if frictions in the labor markets are
low to begin with; and (ii) reductions in trade impediments raise unemployment and welfare simul-
taneously.
The second part of this proposition implies that in a symmetric world trade raises unemployment
worldwide. In other words, the rates of unemployment are higher when countries trade with
each other than when they do not. However, Proposition 3 implies that such countries gain from
trade. Therefore trade is desirable on welfare grounds despite its undesirable consequences for
unemployment.
An intriguing result is that lower trade barriers raise unemployment. To understand the in-
tuition behind this result, observe that the lowering of trade impediments makes exporting more
pro￿table in the di⁄erentiated-product sector, without a⁄ecting tightness in its labor market. As
a result, more ￿rms choose to export in this industry and exporters choose to export larger vol-
umes. In addition, domestic ￿rms that do not serve foreign markets become less pro￿table, which
leads to more exit of low-productivity ￿rms. On account of these changes labor demand rises. To
accommodate this demand, more individuals search for jobs in the di⁄erentiated-product industry.
Under these circumstances, the sectoral unemployment rates remain the same, but the economy￿ s
unemployment rate rises because more workers choose to attach themselves to the high-wage sector,
which has the higher rate of unemployment.
Also note that unemployment can increase or decrease when welfare rises. That is, depending on
the nature of the disturbance and the initial institutional environment, unemployment and welfare
can move in the same or in the opposite direction. For this reason changes in unemployment do
not re￿ ect changes in welfare. This results from the standard property of search-and-matching
models, in which unemployment is a productive activity; it enables workers to be employed in both
low-wage and high-wage activities. Under these circumstances an expansion of the high-wagenhigh-
unemployment sector results in higher unemployment, but may also raise welfare. In this type of
environment, other statistics￿ such as total employment in the high-wage sector (H)￿ are a better
proxy for welfare than the rate of unemployment.
6.2 Small Asymmetries
Consider a world in which country B has the better labor market institutions, so that bA > bB.
Then the labor market is tighter in the ￿ exible country B, and the unemployment rate is lower in
its di⁄erentiated-product sector. The question is whether the country￿ s overall unemployment rate
is also lower? The reason this may not be the case is that more individuals might be searching for
jobs in the high-unemployment sector in the country with lower labor market frictions. We answer
this question below for the case in which labor rigidities do not vary much across countries. In the
next section we discuss global comparisons for the case in which productivity is distributed Pareto.
Suppose that we start from a symmetric equilibrium with bA = bB. As a result, the two
countries look alike in all respects. Next suppose that the labor market rigidities rise in country
27A but do not change in country B, so that ^ bA > 0 and ^ bB = 0. Then we can use (31) and (33)
to calculate the response of the cuto⁄s and the real consumption index in each of these countries,
evaluated at the initially symmetric equilibrium, and we can combine these results with the other
equilibrium conditions to derive the proportional change in the number of individuals seeking jobs
in the di⁄erentiated-product sectors of countries A and B. The technical details are provided in
the Appendix, where we show that
^ NA = ￿￿NA ^ bA;
^ NB = ￿NB ^ bA;
where the coe¢ cients ￿Nj are determined by the initial equilibrium, ￿NA > ￿￿=(￿ ￿ ￿), ￿NB > 0,
and where ￿NA ! ￿￿=(￿ ￿ ￿) and ￿NB ! 0 as ￿ ! 1. Evidently, an increase in labor market
frictions in country A reduces the number of individuals searching for jobs in A￿ s di⁄erentiated-
product sector and increases the number of individuals searching for jobs in country B. Under
these circumstances, (27) yields







^ uB = ￿NB ^ bA:
The implication is that the deterioration of labor market institutions in A raises unemployment in
B, while unemployment rises in A if and only if ￿NA < 1=(b ￿ 1), i.e., if and only if the frictions
in the labor markets are low to begin with; otherwise the rate of unemployment declines in A.
Since ￿NA > ￿￿=(￿￿￿), the open economy A would require even lower labor market frictions than
a closed economy for a deterioration in its labor market institutions to raise its unemployment.
Moreover, since
^ uA ￿ ^ uB = ￿
￿





country A has the higher rate of unemployment after a deterioration in its labor market institutions
if and only if




or if and only if the initial level of frictions in the labor market is rather low. If the initial level
of frictions in the labor markets is high, thereby violating this inequality, then country A has the
lower rate of unemployment.
These results are summarized in the following
Proposition 9 In the vicinity of a symmetric equilibrium: (i) the ￿exible country has a lower rate
of unemployment if and only if the levels of friction in both labor markets are low; otherwise it has
a higher rate of unemployment; and (ii) an improvement in a country￿ s labor market institutions
reduces the rate of unemployment in its trade partner, yet it reduces home unemployment if and
only if the initial levels of friction in both labor markets are low.
28It is evident from this proposition that a country￿ s level of unemployment depends not only on its
own labor market institutions but also on those of its trade partner. Moreover, better domestic
labor market institutions do not guarantee lower unemployment relative to the trade partner, unless
the frictions in both labor markets are low. As a result, one cannot infer di⁄erences in labor market
institutions from observations of unemployment rates.
To understand the intuition behind these results, ￿rst note that an improvement in a country￿ s
labor market institutions a⁄ects its unemployment rate through two channels: on the one hand, the
country￿ s labor market becomes tighter, which reduces the unemployment rate in its di⁄erentiated-
product sector; on the other hand, more workers search for jobs in the di⁄erentiated-product
sector. As a result of these opposing e⁄ects, the overall rate of unemployment declines when the
￿rst channel dominates and rises when the second channel dominates. The ￿rst channel dominates
when the frictions in the labor markets are small, while the second channel dominates for high levels
of labor market rigidities, similar to a closed economy. An interesting implication of Proposition
9 is that improvements of a country￿ s labor market institutions raises the rate of unemployment
in its trade partner. This results from the fact that a reduction of frictions in the labor market of
country j makes j more competitive in the di⁄erentiated-product industry. As a result, the demand
shifts from brands of country (￿j) to the brands of j. In response, the di⁄erentiated-product sector
contracts in country (￿j), which means that fewer people search there for jobs. Since the labor
market frictions do not change in country (￿j), the rate of unemployment in its di⁄erentiated-
product sector does not change either. It therefore follows that the overall rate of unemployment
declines in (￿j) because fewer workers search there for jobs and the fraction of those who ￿nd
employment does not change.
We have derived these results for nearly symmetric equilibria. In the next section we study
large di⁄erences in labor market institutions.
6.3 Large Asymmetries
The results reported so far were derived for either symmetric countries or for a world of small
asymmetries. We have not been able to derive general analytical results about unemployment
rates for environments with large di⁄erences in labor market rigidities. We therefore examine such
environments in this section by means of simulations. The following simulations are interesting for
two reasons. First, they show how the rates of unemployment compare across countries when labor
frictions di⁄er substantially from each other. Second, they show how the degree of similarity in
labor market institutions interacts with trade frictions in shaping unemployment rates.
For the purpose of the simulations we assume that productivity is distributed Pareto. Therefore
the distribution function is





, for ￿ ￿ ￿min and k > 2:
As is well known, the shape parameter k controls the dispersion of ￿, with smaller values of k
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Figure 3: Unemployment as a function of bA when bB is low (bB = 1:1 and ￿ = 1:1)
representing more dispersion. It has to be larger than two for the variance of productivity to
be ￿nite. We show in the Appendix the equilibrium conditions when productivity is distributed
Pareto, and these are the equations used for the simulations.
Figure 3 depicts the response of unemployment rates to variation in country A￿ s labor market
frictions, bA; the rising broken-line curve for country B and the hump-shaped solid-line curve for
country A.55 Country B has bB = 1:1, and therefore the two countries have the same rate of
unemployment when bA = 1:1. As bA rises, country A becomes more rigid. This raises initially the
rate of unemployment in both countries, but the ￿ exible country￿ s rate of unemployment remains
lower for a while. At some point, however, the rate of unemployment reaches a peak in the rigid
country A, and it falls for further increases in bA. As a result, the two rates of unemployment become
equal again, after which further increases in rigidity in country A raise the rate of unemployment
in the ￿ exible country and reduce it in the rigid country, so that the rate of unemployment is
higher in the ￿ exible country thereafter. The mechanism that operates here is that once the labor
market frictions become high enough in country A, the contraction of the di⁄erentiated-product
sector leads to overall lower unemployment in the rigid country despite the fact that its sectoral
unemployment is high. When bA is very high the sectoral unemployment rate is very high, but
no individuals search for jobs in this sector, as a result of which there is no unemployment at all.
This explains the hump in A￿ s curve. Note that in the range in which the rate of unemployment
falls in country A the rate of unemployment keeps rising in country B. The reason is that there
is no change in market tightness in country B and its di⁄erentiated-product sector becomes more
competitive the more rigid the labor market becomes in A. As a result the di⁄erentiated-product
sector attracts more and more workers in country B, which raises its rate of unemployment. The
monotonic impact of country A￿ s labor market rigidities on the unemployment rate in B holds
55In Figures 3-4 we use the following parameters: fx = 3, fd = 1, fe = 0:5, k = 2:5, ￿ = 0:75, ￿ = 0:5 and L = 0:1.
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Figure 4: Unemployment as a function of bA when bB is high (bB = 1:3 and ￿ = 1:1)
globally, and not only around the symmetric equilibrium.56
Figure 4 is similar to Figure 3, except that now the level of labor market frictions in country
B is higher, i.e., bB = 1:3, and therefore the two curves intersect at bA = 1:3. Moreover, starting
with a symmetric world that has these higher labor market rigidities, increases in bA always raise
unemployment in B and reduce unemployment in A. As a result, the rigid country has a lower
level of unemployment independently of the di⁄erence in labor market institutions.
A comparison between Figures 3 and 4 demonstrates the importance of the overall level of labor
market rigidities for unemployment outcomes. When labor market frictions are high, the ￿ exible
country always has a higher rate of unemployment. Moreover, the rates of unemployment in the two
countries move in opposite directions as labor market institutions change in either of the countries.
In contrast, when labor market rigidities are low and as long as the di⁄erences in labor market
institutions are not large, the rate of unemployment is lower in the ￿ exible country and the rates of
unemployment in both countries co-move in response to the changes in labor market institutions.
The next three ￿gures depict variations in unemployment in response to trade frictions, in the
form of variable trade costs ￿: Figure 5 for the case of low frictions in labor markets, Figure 6 for the
case in which frictions are low in the ￿ exible country but high in the rigid country, and Figure 7 for
the case in which the frictions are high in both countries.57 In all three cases unemployment rises
as trade friction falls in the ￿ exible country and declines in the rigid country.58 Nevertheless, the
rate of unemployment is not necessarily higher in the rigid country. In particular, unemployment
is always higher in the rigid country when frictions in labor markets are low in both countries, yet
56In Figures 3-4 country A specializes in the homogenous good when bA ￿ b
0; similarly, in Figure 4, country B
specializes in the homogenous good when bA ￿ b
o.
57In Figures 5-7 we use the following parameters: fx = 5, fd = 1 fe = 0:5, k = 2:5, ￿ = 0:75, ￿ = 0:5 and L = 0:1.
58This pattern is not general. As we know, in the symmetric case lower trade impediments raise unemployment in
both countries. We have also simulated examples in which the rigid country has a hump in its rate of unemployment
as trade frictions vary (this requires bA & bB).














Figure 5: Unemployment as a function of ￿ when bA and bB are low (bA = 1:2 and bB = 1:12)














Figure 6: Unemployment as a function of ￿ when bA is high and bB is low (bA = 1:35 and bB = 1:12)
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Figure 7: Unemployment as a function of ￿ when bA and bB are high (bA = 1:9 and bB = 1:6)
unemployment is always higher in the ￿ exible country when frictions in labor markets are high in
both countries. In between, when labor market frictions are low in the ￿ exible country and high in
the rigid country, the relative rate of unemployment depends on trade impediments; it is lower in
the rigid country when the trade frictions are low and lower in the ￿ exible country when the trade
frictions are high.
7 Concluding Comments
We have studied the interdependence of countries that trade homogeneous and di⁄erentiated prod-
ucts with each other, and whose labor markets are characterized by search and matching frictions in
the di⁄erentiated-product industry. Variation in labor market frictions and the interactions between
trade impediments and labor market institutions generate rich patterns of unemployment. For ex-
ample, better labor market institutions do not ensure lower unemployment, and unemployment
and welfare can both rise in response to a policy change.
Contrary to the complex patterns regarding unemployment, the model yields sharp predictions
about welfare. In particular, both countries gain from trade, but the gains are unevenly distributed,
with the ￿ exible country gaining proportionately more. The latter implies that a country stands to
gain more from reforming its labor market when trade frictions are low rather than high. Reducing
frictions in the domestic labor market raises the competitiveness of home ￿rms. This improves the
foreign country￿ s terms of trade, but also crowds out foreign ￿rms from the di⁄erentiated-product
sector. As a result welfare rises at home and declines abroad (i.e., the terms-of-trade improvement
in the foreign country is overwhelmed by the competitiveness e⁄ect). Nevertheless, across-the-board
improvements in labor market institutions raise welfare in both countries.
These results have a number of policy implications. First, trade and labor market policies
33are complementary to each other. On the one hand, the lower the trade frictions are the more
a country stands to gain from lower frictions in its labor market; and vise versa, the lower the
frictions in the labor market are the more a country stands to gain from lower trade frictions. On
the other hand, when one country improves its labor market institutions and thereby hurts its trade
partner, the trade partner can o⁄set the resulting welfare loss by also improving its labor market
institutions. These results contrast with the implications of models of comparative advantage in
which movements in the terms of trade dominate the outcomes.59
We also show that labor market institutions confer comparative advantage, and that di⁄erences
in these institutions shape trade ￿ ows. In particular, the ￿ exible country exports di⁄erentiated
products on net and imports homogeneous goods. Moreover, the larger the di⁄erence in labor
market institutions the larger is the volume of trade and the lower is the share of intra-industry
trade. These are testable implications about trade ￿ ows and international patterns of specialization.
Finally, we show that trade raises total factor productivity in the di⁄erentiated-product sectors
of both countries (productivity is constant in the homogeneous good sector). Importantly, however,
productivity is higher and the price level is lower in the ￿ exible country. As a result, the ￿ exible
country has a higher (depreciated) real exchange rate. This negative correlation across countries
between productivity and the price level, or the positive correlation between productivity and the
real exchange rate, is opposite to the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect. The implication is that labor
market rigidities produce a bias against the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect, which may help to explain
the failure to ￿nd this e⁄ect in the sample of OECD countries.
59See, for example, Br￿gemann (2003) and Alessandria and Delacroix (2004). The former examines the support for
labor market rigidities in a Ricardian model in which the choice of regime impacts comparative advantage. The latter
analyze a game in which governments control ￿ring taxes, using a Ricardian-style model of complete specialization.
They ￿nd that a coordinated elimination of these taxes yields welfare gains for both counties, yet no country on its
own has an incentive to do it.
34Appendix
An alternative speci￿cation with homothetic preferences for Section 2
We consider here an alternative speci￿cation of the model, with CRRA-CES preferences instead of quasi-
linear preferences used in the main text, leaving the rest of the setup unchanged. The utility is U =







0 + (1 ￿ #)1￿￿Q￿
i1=￿
; ￿ < ￿; 0 < # < 1:
The ideal price index associated with this consumption bundle is
P =
h







where the price of the homogenous good p0 is again normalized to one and P is the price of the di⁄erentiated
product in terms of the homogenous good.
The demand for homogenous and di⁄erentiated goods is given by
q0 = #P￿=(1￿￿)E =
#E





























Since P is increasing in P, the indirect utility is falling in P for a given E. Also Q is decreasing in P.











which increases in P given ￿ > ￿. It proves useful to introduce the aggregate revenue variable








which, like Q and opposite to D, decreases in P.
Most of the remaining derivation of equilibrium conditions remains unchanged, with D given above
instead of D = Q￿(￿￿￿)=(1￿￿) used in the text. Qualitatively all the relationships still hold, except that
now instead of Q as the su¢ cient statistic for welfare and demand level it is more convenient to express all
aggregate variables as functions of P. The only di⁄erence is the no-arbitrage condition which features now
a risk premium for employment seeking in the sector with labor market frictions:
xw1￿￿ = 1;
35so that xw > 1 when x < 1 and there is a chance of being unemployed. Finally, the equilibrium wage is still
equal to b = ax￿, which now leads to
x = b￿(1￿￿) = a
￿(1￿￿)
1+￿(1￿￿);
w = b = a
1
1+￿(1￿￿):
With homothetic preferences, the family interpretation is not necessary as long as ￿ < 1. In this case, the
structure of demand and indirect utility does not change if the worker becomes unemployed, and aggregation
is straightforward, yielding E = L at the aggregate, where L is the number (measure) of individual workers.60
This speci￿cation can be used to analyze issues such as the ex-post income distribution and winners and
losers from policy reforms.
Without showing the explicit derivation (which follows the same steps as in the text), we provide as an
illustration a few comparative statics results for the closed economy with homothetic preferences. Speci￿cally,
we consider labor market deregulation. We have ^ D = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿)^ b, so that, as before, P decreases and Q
















so that unemployment falls if initial labor market institutions are ￿ exible enough and increases otherwise.
These results are qualitatively the same as those derived in the text for quasilinear preferences.











and it is decreasing in b (which is the source of ambiguity in the comparative statics for unemployment).
With these results, we can discuss ex post inequality. A fall in b increases H = xN and reduces w (which
exceeds one), so that both lead to lower ex-post inequality. At the same time, total unemployment (1￿x)N
may increase (if the initial b is high), which would then contribute to higher inequality. It follows that the
comparative statics of inequality are potentially ambiguous in the same way as the results for unemployment
are.
60Note that if ￿ ￿ 1, we still need to recur to the family risk-sharing interpretation in order to avoid an in￿nite
risk premium for employment-seeking in the di⁄erentiated product sector with a possibility of being unemployed.
Alternatively, we can introduce unemployment bene￿ts to resolve this issue, and make the risk premium ￿nite.
36Extension of results on wage pro￿les for Sections 2.3 and 4
We describe here the wage structure when the hiring function is nonlinear and takes the form bjh￿. To avoid







￿ h￿ ￿ bjh￿
o
;
where now transformed productivity is ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿￿￿ and the demand parameter is
















As before, Ij (￿) equals one if the ￿-￿rm in country j exports and zero otherwise. In other words, Aj does
not vary across exporters and it does not vary across non-exporters. It is higher, however, for exporters.












which is, as before, increasing in productivity across nonexporters and across exporters. When ￿ > 1,
optimal employment increases less than proportionally with productivity within each group, and, as a result,
more-productive ￿rms are both larger and pay higher wages, because the wage is











Speci￿cally, the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the productivity of the ￿rm is
￿￿1
￿ and with respect
to the size of the ￿rm, as measured by employment, it is (￿ ￿1). On top of that, workers in exporting ￿rms
receive a discrete wage premium compared to workers in nonexporting ￿rms. That is, ￿rms with ￿ just
above ￿xj pay discretely higher wages than ￿rms just below the export cuto⁄.
We still assume bj = ajx￿



















where Aj (￿) equals Aj, which is higher above the export cuto⁄. Finally, using the de￿nition of bj, we obtain















61Under bilateral Nash bargaining instead of the multilateral bargaining we use, the main results are the same.
The reason is that the structure of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximization problem is similar, because both revenue and hiring












where ￿N is the worker￿ s bargaining weight. In fact, the two problems are identical when ￿N =
￿
￿+￿2+￿. Therefore,
all the qualitative results below are also true under bilateral Nash bargaining.
37Therefore, when ￿ 6= 1, it is no longer possible to identify xj and wj(￿) without solving for other endogenous
variables of the model. Other structural relationships in the model are preserved, and we can solve for the
xjs, outputs and cuto⁄s simultaneously now. Note, however, that within the pool of exporters as well as















This relationship does not depend on the other equilibrium conditions.
Derivation and extension of results for Section 5
We derive here a limit on bA=bB which secures an equilibrium in which both countries are incompletely
specialized. Then we discuss equilibria for which this condition is violated and the rigid country specializes
in homogeneous products. Throughout we assume for concreteness that A is the rigid country, so that
bA=bB ￿ 1. Following the main text, we assume ￿ > 0. For brevity, we will analyze only the equilibria with
￿xB > ￿dB > ￿min, so that in the ￿ exible country not all producing ￿rms export and there also are ￿rms
that exit. The whole analysis can be carried out in a similar manner when either of the inequalities fails,
and the results are broadly similar. Finally, for concreteness, we assume that fx ￿ fd. This assumption is
useful because it guarantees that ￿xB < ￿dB in the type of equilibria that we consider which allows us to
avoid the discussion of separate possible cases. Again the same analysis can be carried out when fx < fd
and it yields similar results.





















Note that this relationship is a (generally nonlinear) upward-sloping curve in (￿dB;￿xB)-space lying between
the 45￿-line and ￿xB = ￿dB￿￿=(1￿￿)fx=fd (i.e., the equilibrium condition when bA = bB).62
We can now prove the following
Lemma 3 For any given ￿ ￿ 1, there exists a unique ￿ b(￿) with ￿ b0(￿) > 0 which turns (37) into equality. For
bA=bB < ￿ b(￿), there is incomplete specialization in equilibrium so that MA > 0. For bA=bB ￿ ￿ b(￿), country
A specializes in the homogenous good so that MA = 0.
Proof: Recall that ￿dB is decreasing and ￿xB is increasing in ￿. This implies that ￿dB=￿xB is increasing
in ￿. (31) implies that ￿
￿￿
1￿￿￿xB=￿dB is increasing in ￿. Next, ￿xB=￿dB and ￿dB=￿xB are decreasing in
bA=bB. These considerations, together with (37), imply that ￿ b(￿) is unique and increasing in ￿ whenever it
is ￿nite.63 Finally, QA=QB is decreasing in bA=bB. Therefore, from (32), MA > 0 whenever bA=bB < ￿ b(￿)
and MA = 0 whenever bA=bB ￿ ￿ b(￿).
62In the special case of Pareto distribution it is a ray through the origin.
63Note that ￿ b(￿) > 1 by construction since ￿xB = ￿dB￿
￿=(1￿￿)fx=fd when bA = bB.
38We consider now equilibria with complete specialization. By Lemma 3 complete specialization in country



























































The ￿rst two equations are the cuto⁄s conditions ￿counterparts of (28) in the text, but only for country
B now since country A does not produce di⁄erentiated goods. Third and fourth equations come from the
de￿nitions of Qjs, equivalent to (23), in which we plug (17), the optimal employment levels of the ￿rms in
country B. The ￿nal equation is the free entry condition (29).




































We now are ready to prove
Proposition 10 In equilibrium with specialization (MA = 0), the following comparative statics hold:
1. ￿dB, ￿xB, and (QA=QB) do not respond to changes in bB. QA and QB fall proportionally in response
to an increase in bB; MB also falls but less than proportionally with the Qjs.
2. ￿dB increases and ￿xB decreases in response to a fall in ￿. MB, QB, and QA=QB all increase in
response to a fall in ￿. Thus, the rigid country bene￿ts more from a reduction in trade impediments.
Proof: We plug (39) into (38) and take the log-derivative:







^ ￿xB ￿ ^ ￿dB
￿
;




^ ￿zB for z 2 fd;xg. From free entry we have
￿dB ^ ￿dB + ￿xB ^ ￿xB = 0:












so that ￿dB decreases and ￿xB increases in ￿. Also note that neither threshold responds to bB. This result
implies that ￿dB increases and ￿xB decreases in ￿ and they do not respond to bB. This observation together
with (39) imply that QA=QB does not respond to bB and decreases in ￿. Log-di⁄erentiation of the cuto⁄
condition for ￿dB results in
￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
^ QB = ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
^ bB + ^ ￿dB:
Therefore, QB and QA fall proportionally as bB increases; QA and QB both decrease in ￿ and QA does so
proportionally more. Finally, the results for MB follow from the equation for QB:
^ MB = ￿ ^ QB ￿ ^ ￿dB
Therefore, MB falls in ￿; it also falls in bB but less than proportionally compared to the Qj￿ s (since ￿ < 1).
Proposition 10 emphasizes the important di⁄erence of equilibria with specialization from that with
incomplete specialization (see Proposition 2 in the text). In equilibria with specialization, the rigid country
is the one that gains proportionately more from a reduction in trade impediments; moreover, both countries
equally gain from the improvements in the labor market institutions in the ￿ exible country. The reason is
that now there is no competitiveness e⁄ect anymore, which was crowding-out the ￿rms in the rigid country
as trade was becoming less costly or as labor market of the trade partner was becoming more ￿ exible. Now
the only e⁄ect is the terms of trade e⁄ect, i.e. the reduction in the price level of the di⁄erentiated goods
when ￿ or bB fall. A reduction in trade costs on top of that makes the consumption baskets (i.e., the
number of varieties and their quantities consumed) in the two countries more similar which leads to a partial
convergence in the welfare di⁄erential between the countries.
Derivation of results on productivity for Section 5.3
We ￿rst show that ’zj = ’(￿zj) is monotonically increasing in ￿zj. The log-derivative of ’(￿zj) is


































where the ￿rst inequality follows from Jensen￿ s inequality and the second inequality comes from the fact that









































A series of su¢ cient conditions can be suggested for the terms in curly brackets to be positive. Since
TFPj > ￿
(1￿￿)=￿




which holds for large enough ￿xj, i.e., when the economy is relatively closed, however, it fails in general as

























that is G00(￿) has to be negative and large enough in absolute value. This condition is satis￿ed for the Pareto
distribution since in this case ￿(￿) is constant and, thus, ￿dj ￿ ￿xj. However, it is not satis￿ed, for example,
for the exponential distribution.












6 ’xj ￿ ’dj





















This condition also does not hold in general; however, it is certainly satis￿ed for large enough ￿xj.
Now we provide the derivation of equation (36) under the assumption of Pareto-distributed productivity
draws. When ￿ is distributed Pareto with the shape parameter k > 1=￿, there is a straightforward way of
computing the change in TFPj. Taking the log derivative of (35), we have
[ TFPj =
"
￿dj’dj^ ￿dj + ￿xj’xj^ ￿xj
￿dj’dj + ￿xj’xj
￿




￿dj’dj^ ’dj + ￿xj’xj^ ’xj
￿dj’dj + ￿xj’xj
:
Under the Pareto assumption, the free-entry condition (29) can be written as ￿dj +￿xj = kfe, which implies
￿dj^ ￿dj + ￿xj^ ￿xj = 0. We use this to simplify
[ TFPj =
￿dj’dj
￿^ ￿dj + ^ ’dj
￿
+ ￿xj’xj




Next note that ￿zj = fz
k
k￿1(￿min=￿zj)k so that ^ ￿zj = ￿k^ ￿zj and ’zj = k￿1
k￿1=￿￿
(1￿￿)=￿
zj , implying ^ ’zj =
(1￿￿)=￿^ ￿zj. Thus, the log-derivative of the free-entry condition can also be written as ￿dj ^ ￿dj+￿xj ^ ￿xj = 0.
41Therefore,
￿dj
￿^ ￿dj + ^ ’dj
￿
= ￿￿xj




k ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=￿
￿
￿dj ^ ￿dj:






















which is a weighted average of 1 (the productivity in the homogenous sector) and TFP00
j ￿ Hj=Nj ￿ TFPj
(productivity in the di⁄erentiated-product sector). The weights are the respective fractions of the two sectors
in the total labor resources. Note that \ TFP00
j = [ TFPj ￿^ bj. If TFP00
j > 1, an extensive increase in the size
of the di⁄erentiated sector improves productivity. Reduction in trade costs and labor market deregulation
additionally shift resources towards the di⁄erentiated sector by increasing Nj. These are the additional
e⁄ects captured by this alternative measure of aggregate productivity.
Derivation of results for Section 6.2
For ^ bB = ^ ￿ = 0 and ^ bA > 0, (31) yield:
^ ￿dA = ￿
￿xA
￿
(￿xB + ￿dB)^ bA < 0; ^ ￿xA =
￿dA
￿




(￿xA + ￿dA)^ bA > 0; ^ ￿xB = ￿
￿dB
￿
(￿xA + ￿dA)^ bA < 0:
Using these expressions together with (33) we obtain
￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
^ QA = ￿
￿dB
￿






(￿xA + ￿dA)^ bA > 0:
For an initially symmetric equilibrium these expressions become
^ ￿dA = ￿
￿x￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿d ￿ ￿x)
^ bA < 0; ^ ￿xA =
￿d￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿d ￿ ￿x)
^ bA > 0;
^ ￿dB =
￿x￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿d ￿ ￿x)
^ bA > 0; ^ ￿xB = ￿
￿d￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿d ￿ ￿x)




^ QA = ￿
￿d￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿d ￿ ￿x)





(1 ￿ ￿)(￿d ￿ ￿x)
^ bA > 0:
























































We di⁄erentiate these equations, starting from a symmetric equilibrium with bA = bB, and consider a small

























￿d ^ Qj ￿ ￿d^ ￿dj ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿




















G0 (￿z)￿z; z 2 fd;xg:
The ￿rst two equations can be expressed as




































￿x + ￿d￿x + ￿x￿d
￿
> 0:















































Therefore, MA unambiguously decreases in bA and MB increases in bA. Also note that as ￿ ! 1, ￿x, ￿x




￿￿￿ so that ^ MB = 0
43and ^ MA = ￿
￿￿
￿￿￿
^ bA, which is exactly the case of the closed economy.










￿d￿d ￿ ￿x￿x + ￿d￿x ￿ ￿x￿d
o￿









￿d￿x ￿ ￿x￿d + ￿d￿x ￿ ￿x￿d
o￿
^ bA ￿ ￿NB ^ bA;
where the ￿rst term in the square brackets comes from the changes in Mj and bj and the second term comes





























When ￿ ! 1, we have ￿NA !
￿￿
￿￿￿ and ￿NB ! 0, and when ￿ < 1 we have ￿NA >
￿￿
￿￿￿.
Total employment in the di⁄erentiated sector changes according to:
^ HA = ^ NA + ^ xA = ￿(1 + ￿NA)^ bA and ^ HB = ^ NB = ￿NB ^ bA
and unemployment responds as
^ uA = ^ NA ￿
x
1 ￿ x






^ bA and ^ uB = ^ NB = ￿NB ^ bA:











Therefore, unemployment at home will rise in response to increased ￿ exibility in the home labor market in
an open economy whenever it does so in a closed economy, but not necessarily the opposite.
Solution of the model under the Pareto assumption for Section 6.3
We characterize here the solution of the model under the assumption that productivity draws ￿ are distrib-
uted Pareto with the shape parameter k > 2. That is, G(￿) = 1 ￿ (￿min=￿)k de￿ned for ￿ ￿ ￿min. We
later use this characterization in order to solve numerically for the equilibrium response of unemployment
to di⁄erent shocks.













; z 2 fd;xg





xj = (k ￿ 1)fe￿
￿k
min , ￿dj + ￿xj = kfe:
44Manipulating cuto⁄ conditions (28) and the free entry condition above, we can obtain two equations to

































xA = (k ￿ 1)fe￿
￿k
min;





and there are similar conditions for country B, with  






























































































which is satis￿ed for large ￿ and for   ￿ bA=bB not very di⁄erent from one. Next note that as ￿ ! 1,






d. Therefore, the condition for ￿c
d > ￿min is k < 1 + fd=fe
which is equivalent to the condition in the text. One can also show that ￿dA decreases in ￿ in the range
￿ 2 (￿￿;1) where













The ￿rst cuto⁄ condition in (28) allows to solving for Qj once ￿dj is known; Qj is also decreasing in ￿
in the range (￿￿;1). It is straightforward to show that Qj decreases in bA and increases in bB. Using the





































One can show that this inequality imposes a restriction on parameters f￿; ;fx=fdg such that ￿ > ￿￿( ;fx=fd),
which implies that Qj is decreasing in ￿ whenever there is no complete specialization (Mj > 0 for both j).
This is consistent with Lemma 1 in the text.















that is, under Pareto assumption, Nj is always proportional with Mj. The remaining equilibrium conditions
are
Hj = Nj=bj and uj = (1 ￿ b
￿1
j )Nj=L:
We use the equations above to solve for equilibrium comparative statics numerically. Certain analytical
results can also be obtained under the Pareto assumption for Mj, Nj and uj departing from (42).
Remark for Section 5.2: Under the Pareto assumption we can get a simple prediction about the response























































As bA increases or bB falls, the denominator remains unchanged while ￿xA=￿dA and QB increase and QA
decreases. As a result the volume of trade unambiguously rises. Finally, one can also show that XB decreases


























Now note that XB decreases in ￿ since QA and QB=QA decrease in ￿ and QB > QA.
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